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ABSTRACT
Changes in political attitudes toward subsidizing mortgage loans and in
technologies for transacting mortgage loans and for pooling and refinancing
individual mortgage contracts threaten to remake the face of U.S.mortgage
markets. This paper focuses on economic-efficiency benefits embodied innarrow-
ed interest-rate spreads and on distributional effects for different marketpartici-
pants created by three categories of change: changing strategies for controlling
implicit federal guarantees; continuing evolution in the character ofmortgage-
backed securities; and expanding electronic mortgage-application networks.It
proves instructive to classify these effects further according to whether they are
transitional or permanent in nature and whether they are technologically drivenor
filtered through the political process.
The analysis emphasizes that technological change is reducing the con-
trollability of aggregate subsidies associated with longstanding patterns of provid-
ing implicit and explicit federal guarantees for the liabilities of important mort-
gage-market participants and discusses several proposals for bringing the market
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CHANGEAND PROGRESS IN CONTEMPORARY MORTGAGE MARKETS
EdwardJ. Kane*
Whenever the landscape of our lives changes rapidly, it ishelpful to contern-
plate two texts. The first is an aphorism enunciated almost 2,500years ago by the
Greek philosopher 1-leraclitus: "Nothing is permanentexcept change:'
Pursuing the psychological reverberations of this thought, we may observe
that the more rapid the rate of change becomes, the moredeeply stressed and
disoriented disadvantaged participants feel. Feelings of unsettlementexperienced
in confronting the unfamiliar are the distinctive fare of science fiction.In this
genre, writers have speculated repeatedly about how socially disruptive it would be
if scientists were to discover how to accelerate the rate oftechnological change.
Reinforcing its readers' instinctive fear of a lurking unknown, this literature
often advances the view that accelerated technological change would evoke
undesirable adjustments in lifestyle and environment that woulddramatically
worsen the human situation. However, for the long run, the history of scientific
and technological achievement supports the opposite result. If Heraclitus could be
transported to our time, he would be literally dazzled by advances in technology
that, by freeing mankind from slaving to fulfill its most basic requirements for
survival, have sharply expanded the horizons of human activity. This thought leads
conveniently into our second text (one that in the 1950s, as a television spokesman
for General Electric, Ronald Reagan used to preach every Sunday night): "Progress
is our most important product."
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author wishes to thank HUB for financial support and Ann Dougherty, ack
Guttentag, Joseph Humphrey, George Kaufman, Anthony Sanders, David Seiders,
Robert Yan Order, and Kevin Yillani for helpful comments. Opinions expressed are
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Of course, not all change is progressive. Contemporaryadjustments in
mortgage markets are driven by two conceptually distinct forces: the shifting
winds of political consensus and the steadier blast of technologicalchange.
Although the long-run effects of technologically driven change are progressive,
politically driven change is oriented toward the short run and is often regressive.
Politically Filtered Changes
What we may call politically filtered changes in mortgage markets represent
economic responses to changes in the flow of implicit and explicit federal taxes
and subsidies to housing finance. Historically, various federal agencies have sought
to help mortgage markets by smoothing the interest-rate cycle, underpricing
deposit-insurance guarantees for maturity and credit risk undertaken by specialized
mortgage lenders, imposing housing-related deposit-rate ceilings and asset restric-
lions on thrift institutions, guaranteeing cash flows on mortgage instruments, and
subsidizing interest rates on mortgage loans for low-income housing. During the
1980s, public policy has aimed at eliminating or at least reducing most of these
subsidies.
We may identify two watershed changes, with several more still under
discussion. The first is the October 6, 1979 reorientation of Federal Reserve anti-
inflationary monetary policy. Since that date, the Fed has fought inflation in ways
that have greatly increased the volatility of market interest rates. Prior to this
date, Fed efforts to smooth short-run changes in interest rates served to reduce
the exposure of short-borrowing, long-lending mortgage lenders (i.e., thrift institu-
tions) to large overnight declines in the market value of their net worth.' The
second watershed change was the staged abandonment of the two-pronged regula-
tory strategy of simultaneously requiring thrift institutions to specialize in
mortgage lending and trying to beef up their profit margins by imposing a
discriminatory system of ceilings on the explicit interest rates they and other3
deposit institutions could pay on deposits.This changein strategy was first
embodiedin the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, which liberalized asset powers for thrift institutions and established an
interagency committee to deregulate deposit-rate ceilings. The Cam-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 moved both legs of the new strategy forward by
authorizing money market deposit accounts and further relaxing restraints on
thrift-institution diversification. As documented in George Kaufman's and David
Seiders' pieces for this symposium, thrift institutions' pursuit of opportunities to
restructure their balance sheets only temporarily reduced these institutions'
relative role in financing the flow of new mortgages.
Other subsidy-reducing proposals under active consideration include:
I. the possibility of introducing new restrictions on the guarantee and
mortgage-banking authority of Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie
Mac;
2. the possibility of explicitly or implicitly repricing federal deposit
insurance to reduce the effective subsidy to maturity mismatching
and default risk inherent in an insured thrift institution's mortgage
lending.
My reading of the bureaucratic and legislative record indicates that (except for the
1984 passage of a tax—law provision to subject Freddie Mac income to federal
income taxation) the first proposal is at least temporarily stymied. The second
proposal has been embodied in FSLIC and FOIC requests for authority to set risk-
rated insurance premia and naive regulatory efforts to impose lower insurance
limits on brokered deposits and to persuade insured thrift institutions to switch
their new lending from fixed—rate mortgages (FRM5) to adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARMs). For many S&Ls, the FHLB's signalling that its examiners would view ARM
lending favorably made ARMs the vehicle of choice for exploiting deposit-
insurance subsidies to mortgage lending. The unintended effect of this FSLIC
effort to promote ARMs has been to encourage the sharpest of its clients to
transform straightforward interest-volatility risk into exotic forms of credit risk.4
Observableshifts inpublic policy respond to lobbying pressures against which
it is feasible to organize an effective political counterattack. Theprofitability of
managing the industry's lobbying efforts may explain why spokespersons for the
traditional community of housing lenders tend toexaggerate the Jong-run effects
of government subsidies on the profitability ofmortgage lending. In effect, they
advertise political action as both the cause and the remedy for allindustry
problems. While this may maximize political action and industry contributions to
trade-association coffers, economic analysis suggests that, for individualmanagers,
it is a distinctly unhelpful perspective.It directs their attention to battling
collectively to undo the effects of change rather adapting individually to its
consequences.
Promoters of lobbying efforts fail to appreciate how quickly and how
thoroughly in a competitive industry the benefits of subsidies dissipate over time.
The age-old problem with striving to target subsidies to producers ofany govern-
mentally approved good or service --includingthat of housing finance --isthat
market entry by unintended beneficiaries and competitionamong the intended
beneficiaries tends to shift the subsidies away to other parties: specifically to
customers and to suppliers of the factor services employed in producing and
distributing the subsidized products. Even if the gcvernment had intended subsidies
to mortgage lenders to stay with these lenders (which is doubtful), it could not put
handles on them. As a result, price competition has spilled these subsidies out of
the income statements of specialized lenders into the economy at large. Unless
one recognizes that the fragility of market power prevents subsidies from staying
put, it is hard to understand why a group as heavily subsidized ex ante as
specialized mortgage lenders could have proved so spectacularly unprofitable ex
pover the last 18 years.
For mortgage lenders, the bright side of this coin is that reductions in these
subsidies ought to be shifted, too. Because the shifting process figures to reduceboth the aggregate value of new investments in housing and the amount of
mortgage debt in the economy, in the short run specialized mortgage lenders can
best maintain profit margins by diversifying their activities into additional lines of
financial service. To do this most effectively, industrymanagers must understand
and make friends with the technologically driven changes that are currently
unfolding in contemporary markets for financial services.
Technologically Driven Changes
During the last decade, technological change in the methods used to produce
and distribute credit in U.S. mortgage markets has been both extraordinarily rapid
and extraordinarily wide-ranging.Innovations have occurred in the rights and
duties incorporated into mortgage contracts, in direct and indirect opportunities
for taking and unwinding positions in these contracts, and in the activities
undertaken by contracting parties and their agents in arranging deals. So that we
may have a label for each type of innovation, we may call them the destandardiza-
tion, the securitized stripping, and the electronification of mortgage loans. The
common effect of all three developments has been progressive:to perfect
interregional and interinstitutional competition at all stages of making and
financing mortgage loans.The effect is to reduce the implicit and explicit
resource costs of lining up and transacting the best deal possible.Secular
reductions in transactions costs have sharply increased the transactional efficiency
of mortgage markets, reducing the cost of taking margined and short positions in
mortgage instruments and enabling market participants to adjust their pre-existing
balance sheets to changes in investment opportunities more quickly and more
completely than ever before.2
By lowering barriers to entry into local mortgage markets, this increase in
transactional efficiency has fostered an invasion of these markets by extraregional
and other nontraditional competitor5. This has had three observable effects. First,6
it has lowered the costs of mortgage contracting and narrowed the spread between
mortgage interest rates and yields on Treasury and corporate bonds of similar
duration.The development of electronic methods of mortgage banking and
organized forward and secondary markets for whole and stripped mortgage loans
has forged new and tighter arbitrage links between movements in interest rates in
informal markets for mortgages and movements in rates of returns in organized
markets for securities of various types. Second, it has restructured and relocated
industry work flows, establishing a more-extensive pattern of specialization that in
many cases reduces the flow of quasi-rents to traditional market participants from
personal expertise and localized transactional networks they have built up over the
years.
Third, it has assisted the destandardization or customization of the contract
for home loans.Customized elements include graduated payment schedules
(including first-year buydowns by sellers), prepayment options, assumability priv-
ileges, lines of credit conditioned on homeowner equity, equity sharing, and various
kinds of adjustable-rate triggers and caps on the level to which adjustable rates or
monthly payments may escalate.3 In exchange for an appropriate adjustment in
contract interest rates, other contract terms can be tailored either to eliminate or
to counterbalance portfolio risks of particular concern to the borrowing or the
lending party in the mortgage contract. For individual lending institutions, forward
and secondary markets facilitate a cafeteria-style offering of heterogeneous
contract forms in two ways. First, these markets provide base prices from which
lenders may conveniently calculate a market value for various customized contract
features that particular classes of borrowers find attractive. Second, opportunities
to sell uncongenial contracts into these markets (particularly improved opportuni-
ties for selling off relatively liquid FRMs) permit an institution to put a wider
range of loan contracts into its servicing portfolio than concern for economically
controlling its exposure to interest-rate risk might let it retain in its investment
portfolio.7
Technological Innovations in the 1980s.
During the early 1980s, partly because of pressure from deposit-insurance
agencies, adjustable-rate home loans have begun to push fixed-rate loans into the
background. This is especially true of the market for conventional mortgages,
where since November, 1983 ARMs' percentage of the flow of new loans has
exceeded 50 percent. This passage has been facilitated by two technologically
driven innovations: collateralized mortgage obligations and electronic mortgage-
application networks.
Although CMOs based on ARMs are now only in the planning stage, CMO
technology has facilitated the spread of ARMs in two ways. First, because it
increases the liquidity of FRMs, this technology makes it easier for a local lender
to emphasize adjust4ble-rate lending without depriving its customers of an
effective choice between ARM and FRM financing. Preserving this choice has
neutralized consumerist fears that held up the introduction of ARMs in many
jurisdictions during the early l970s. Second, the success of the CMO as a vehicle
for unloading FRMs creates a parallel demand for forms of mortgage-backed
securities that could be based on ARMs. To keep their loans easily absorbable into
future ARM pools, lenders have an incentive to limit the variety of ARM triggers,
adjustment periods, and caps to conform to developing industry standards.
Electronic mortgage-application networks allow adjustable-rate lenders to
offer funds over a wider region. They also make it easier for a would-be borrower
(perhaps with the assistance of an associated expert or software package) to
compare alternative contracts.Taken together, these innovations provide a
market solution to the problem of information overload in comparing the terms of
customized mortgage contracts that leads Guttentag (1983) to declare a need for
industry self-regulation to control expansion in mortgage designs.S
Collateralized Mortgage Securities. With aggregate mortgage debt approaching 1.5
trillion dollars, it is not surprisingthatsecurities firms would strive to win
themselves a piece of the action. To make mortgage-backed securities attractive
to a broad range of institutional investors, three serious conceptual problems had
to be solved:
1. Howtoaggregate (or "package") cash flows from a collection of
diverse low-denomination mortgage loans into anintelligiblehigh-
denomination asset pool;
2. How to relieve investors in these pools of the need to evaluate the
credit risk of the individual mortgages in the pool;
3. What to do about the risk that optional borrower prepayments may
drastically shorten the effective maturity of the pool.
The first generation of mortgage-backed securities (MBS)solvedthe first two
problems without explicitly addressing the third. Called mortgage participations or
pass-through securities, these instruments promise to pass along all payments
custodians receive from servicers of the pooled contracts, with investors guaran-
teed against servicer nonperformance by an ownership claim on the mortgage pool
and against borrower default and delinquency by private mortgage insurers and/or
one of the big-five federal housing-credit agencies or agency-corporations. These
guarantors are the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), the
Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), the Government National
Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"), the Federal Housing Administration (The
FHA), and the Veterans Administration (the VA).
However, the unavailability of call protection limited the extent to which
passthroughs could appeal to insurance companies and pension funds. These long—
term investors were not excited about acquiring participation certificates which9
required them to take a short position in a calloption owned by mortgage
borrowers. They had reservations not just about theunpredictability of prepay-
ments, but especially about the likelihood that they would beconcentrated in
periods when interest rates would be low,sothat the proceeds would have to be
reinvested at unfavorable yields. The collateralizedmortgage obligation (CMO)is
a second..generatjon mortgage-backed securitydesigned specifically to permit
different investors to take title to theearly and late cash flows generated by the
pool of mortgages serving as collateral (Villani, 1983). In that itinvolves stripping
and repackaging the cash flows on aprimary security, a CMO parallels the cutely
nicknamed zero-coupon "animal" securities thatinvestment_banking firms fashion
from ordinary Treasury bonds. Packagers ofCMOs sell investors, not direct
participations in the proceeds of a mortgage pool, butsegregated claims to the
early, intermediate, and distant cash flows that theunderlying pool of mortgages
(or mortgage participation certificates)actually throws off.
Pioneered by Freddie Mac in June 1983, the typical CMOdesignates three or
four classes of bonds, scheduled to be paid offserially. Until the first or shortest
class is fully retired, its holders receive allprincipal payments thrown off by the
pool. Only then do principal payments accrue to the secondmaturity class. Only
after both of these classes have been paid off, doprincipal payments begin to flow
to the third class, and so on. Usually, all classespay interest semiannually,
although sometimes the longest class merely accrues its interest until all faster-
paying classes have been retired.
Earmarking flows of principal payments for holders of thefaster-paying
classes enlists into the direct provision of home financeinstitutional investors
whose hedging interests or maturity habitats are short-term.At the same time, it
serves to lengthen the duration (or average futurity) of thelate-paying securities10
and to shiftsomeof the burdenof borrowers' prepayment optionsfrom long-term
to shorter-term investors. Figure 1 shows that the relative sharespurchased by
deposit institutions, insurance companies, and pension funds in the three classesof
Freddie Mac's first CMO correspond broadly with conventional wisdomabout the
distribution of these firms' marginal hedging interests.
In 1983, approximately 11 CMO issues were floatedpublicly, amounting to
about $4 billion in the aggregate. At least $6 billionmore were issued in the first
five months of 1984. Table 1 disaggregates the first 28 CMO issuesby the type of
institution doing the packaging. Table 2 disaggregates thesesame issues by the
type of collateral whose cash flows are being stripped.
Except that it maintains no net-worth account (which prevents it from
accepting any interest—rate risk) and issues its liabilities into securities markets
rather than directly to depositors, a CMO packageroperates very much like an
S&L. It supports a portfolio of mortgages with liabilities ofvarying maturity.
CMOs issued by a government conduit are effectivelygovernment-guaranteed.
Although CMOs issued by private conduits are not guaranteed directly, they are
backed by mortgage assets that are at least partly insured byone of the
government mortgage corporations (usually GNMA). Also, because CMO liabilities
are securities rather than deposits, their minimum denomination is probably never
smaller than $25,000 and their average denomination is typically higher rather than
lower than the average denomination of the mortgages they finance. In fact, to
qualify for an FHLMC or FNMA guarantee, the value of the individual mortgages in
a CMO must not exceed a ceiling of approximately $114,000.
As this analogy should make clear, any S&L could in principle package its
mortgage portfolio into a CMO and even issue CMOs in small denominations to
its retail customers. Because S&Ls' average yield on their mortgage portfolios1!
Figure1
Institutional Profile of Investors in the Three Series of FHLMC's
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Source:Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Notes:
1. "Other" includes trust companies, broker/dealers, credit unions, corpora-
tions, and individuals.
2. The fastest—paying security is labelled A—i, the slowest A-3.12
Table 1
First Twenty-eight Issues of Collateralized MortgageObligations,
Disaggregated by TypeofInstitution Doing the Packaging
Dollar
Number of Number of Amount
Issuers Issues (inbillions)
Freddie Mac 1 4 2.93
Builder Bonds 4 11 1.75






Totals: 14 28 10.32
Source: Kevin Villani, "Innovations in the Mortgage Markets,"
Everett D. Reese-Park National Bank Distinguished.
Lectures, Columbus, Ohio, May 24, 1984.'3
Table 2
First Twenty-Eight Issues of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations,
Disaggregated by Type of Collateral Employed
Dollar
Number of Number of Amount
Type of Collateral Issuers Issues (in billions)
1. PooLs of Whole Mortgage Loans Only
a. Conventional Mortgagess 2 5 3.29
b. Conventional and FHA/VA mortgages 1 1 0.27
2. Pools Using Mortgage-Backed Securiti
a. Conventional Mortgages, 1 1 0.08
FNMA MBS, and FHLMC
participation certificates
b. PNMA MBS and GNMA securitj 1 1 1.25
c. GNMA seeuriti 11 20 5.44
TOTALS 16 28 10.32
Source: Same as Table 1
tThis row includes the four FHLMC issuescurrently lies well below today's roughly 14.25 percent yield on new fixed-rate
mortgages, such a CMO would probably need to be issued at a discount from par.
Compared to CMOs issued at par, a discount CMO would have the advantage of
providing greater call protection for all classes of investors than a nondiscount
issue.
But because only its deposit liabilities are explicitly guaranteed (by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or FSLIC), an S&L's CMOs would
be subject to credit risk. Before they could be designated as investment—grade
securities, this credit risk would in practice have to be insured by a credible party
or rated formally by Moody's or Standard and Poor's. Under state prudent-man
rules and federal pension-fund legislation, CMOsthat are not rated as investment—
grade could be held only in limited amounts by individual insurance companies and
pension funds. However, until the FSLIC clarified how it would settle the claims of
CMOholdersin the event that an issuing S&L went bankrupt, private insurance
companies and credit-rating firms could not analyze all relevant contingencies.
Without knowing how the FSLIC would treat holders of discounted CMOs in a
liquidation, they could not prudently undertake to guarantee or rate an Sc5cL's CMO.
In connection with a CMO proposed by Guardian Savings and Loan of Houston,
Standard & Poor's began to negotiate with the FSLIC in late 1983. In early 1984
they agreed upon a tentative formula for use in marking CMOs to market in the
event of the liquidation of an S&L issuer (LaGesse, 1984b). Because the FDJC has
not taken a position on the issue and because the FSLIC has reserved the right to
challenge CMOs that promise to pay a premium to bondholders if the bond
agreement is liquidated, Standard and Poor's still will not rate CMOs from FDJC-
insured institutions or from S&Ls that stipulate redemption at a premium in the
case of insolvency.
Given how far underwater the S&L industry is sinking, the FSLIC might want to
investigate issuing its own CMOs and mortgage passthroughs, which could be15
backed up by pools of mortgage loans it would take over in closing insolvent
institutions. In many cases, liquidating an S&L. via a CMO may offeracheaper
method of resolving its failure than making merger-assistance payments and
regulatory concessions to an acquirer that is reluctant to take on the burden of the
failing firm's problems.
Electronic Mortgage-Application Networks. CMOS and other MBS may be
regarded as establishing more-intricate connections between mortgage originators
and ultimate suppliers of mortgage capital.Electronic mortgage-application
networks complement MBS by forging new links between homebuyers and mortgage
originators. Using realtors as points of personal contact, these networks computer-
ize and "telecommunicate" one or more steps in the process of shopping and
negotiating for a home loan.
The pioneer network 15 Shelternet, which is owned by First Boston Corp. and
began operation in July 1983. At la5t report, Shelternet had 40 participating
lenders and serviced 125 originators in 30 states. Its services run the gamut from
maintaining lists of mortgage designs and contract interest rates currently offered
by participating lenders (so far, all of these are thrift institutions) through taking
and processing loan applications and committing lender funds. Two networks that
limit themselves merely to mortgage listing are: RKI Databanks and the Realtors
National Mortgage Access System (Rennie Mae). In early 1984, other full-service
networks were just beginning to come on-line.
Quantitatively, electronic mortgage markets are still minor players. In its
first nine months, Shelternet processed about 1,000 applications and closed about
500 mortgages that in the aggregate were worth only about $3.5 million dollars
(LaGesse, 1984a). However, by April 1984, Shelternet was handling almost $100
million worth of applications a month. The outlook for these networks is extremely
favorable. They facilitate intelligible disclosure of relevant mortgage information.
Also, as long as realtors are clever enough to find a label for loan-origination fees16
that does not violate the Real Estate Settlement PracticesAct, these networks
permit realtors to upgrade their service package and tocapture income that would
otherwise accrue to local lenders ormortgage-banking firms. However, this
activity might make them subject as "arrangers of credit" to the Fed'sRegulation
z.
Winners and Losers From Mortgage-Market Innovations
Effects on Mortgage Lenders
The evolving division of labor in mortgage financeputs a premium on a firm's
capacity to recognize and to adapt to changing business opportunities and greatly
complicates the work of every regulatory agency whose mission requires it to
influence the price or quantity of mortgage credit.
Overtime,electronic and abstract derivative forms of mortgage contracting
are displacing familiar product forms and face-to—facesystemsfor distributing
them. Atthesame time that this process reduces the profitability of traditional
activities, it opens up opportunities to produce, distribute, and finance the
emergent contract forms. Unfortunately, traditional mortgage lenders typically
see the darker side of the process more clearly than the brighter one. They tend to
be put off emotionally by the transitional costs of adjusting theirskills, capital,
and operating procedures to the evolving requirements of the marketplace. Inan
era of rapid change, resistance to jettisoning organization structures and contract
limitations that proved successful in the past makes traditionalmortgage lenders
slow to recognize emerging opportunities for arbitraging differences inprofitabil-
ity between new and old ways of doing things. This lag in adaptation by traditional
players encourages nontraditional players — in the form of mortgage-pooling firms
such as Freddie Mac and securities firms such as Salomon Brothers, FirstBoston,
and Merrill Lynch -- to expand their role in mortgage financing.
Specialized mortgage lenders have traditionally viewed mortgagor and prop-
erty evaluation, contract design, loan processing, funds commitment, mortgage17
servicing, and mortgage financing as activities to beperformed under their direct
supervision. When activities are performed jointly in-house rather thancontracted
out to specialists, the implicit prices ofcomponent services are not separately
observable. Only the bundled price is directly observed.Advances in telecommun-
ications and in forward and secondary markets letoutside observers unbundle the
prices of the component activities of mortgagelending. They allow individual
activities to be performed in different combinations, whosepublicly quoted prices
may be stripped apart to price individual functions separately. Thisstripping and
explicit pricing separates activities in these submarkets and facilitatesentry from
extraregional functional specialists. This entry tends to eradicateany pockets of
monopoly power in local markets for originating and servicingmortgages. At the
same time, it squeezes ex ante returns for financingmortgage down to the level of
securities yields generally. Taken together, thesechanges encourage realtors to
guide homebuyers through the loan-application, contract-design, andloan-pro-
cessing stages and encourages traditional mortgage lenders both to concentrateon
the mortgage-origination and mortgage-servicing functions andto price these
services closer to operating costs.
in principle, investment-banking houses, brokerage firms, and commercial
banks have back-office capabilities and deliverysystems that make it relatively
easy for them to perform the so-called conduit function of buyingup mortgages in
the secondary market and of packaging (or transforming) them intomortgage-
backed securities (MBS). On the marketing or distributionside, these same firms
are well-situated both to identify potential customers (householdas well as
institutional investors) and to advise these customers as to thetypes of mortgage-
backed securities that would best fit their portfolio objectives.Their major
problem is to provide from their own credit standing or to secure froma third18
party credible guarantees of promised cash flows.In practice, FNLMC has
dominated the conduit function.4 In early 1984, highly ratedprivate conduits for
CMOs (specifically Sears Mortgage Securities Corp., General Electric CreditCorp.,
Residential Funding Corp., Norwest Mortgage Co., and FCAMortgage Securities)
began to make substantial plays. On the underwriting side, pre-existing limitations
on deposit institutions' investment_banking powers have helped to deflect the bulk
of the underwriting business so far to securities firms.Deposit institutions'
principal cut of the MBS business has been to earn fees as servicers or as
custodians of the mortgage pool.
Mortgage-backed securities collateralized by mortgage pools that are assem-
bled by builders (so-called "builder bonds") promise to shift additionalopportunities
to make mortgages on new homes from deposit institutions to builders'mortgage-
banking subsidiaries and to securities firms. Builder bonds permit construction
firms to designate sales of completed homes as installment sales for taxpurposes.
This means that builders are taxed as the owner makes amortizationpayments
rather than at the time of sale. The proceeds of the bonds enable builders to enjoy
the cash flow of an outright sale, while taking buyers' mortgages defers most of the
tax liability to future years. Because of the tax savings, a builder can afford to
offer a below-market interest rate to buyers of his products. U.S. Home Corp. and
Pulte Inc. have had their own builder—bond program for severalyears. Consor-
tiums launching multibuilder issues include:the Ryland Group of Columbia,
Maryland; American Southwest Financial Corp.; and the National Association of
Home Builders (Schellhardt, 1983). More recently, investment-banking houses
(Kidder, Peabody, & Co. and Salomon Brothers, Inc.) have developed nonconsortium
programs for smaller builders (LaGesse, 1984c). Unless the installment-sales tax
option is changed, if thrift institutions don't want to be squeezed out of new-home
financing in the long run, they may have to establish themselves a developers.19
At the same time that entry into mortgage markets by builders and securities
firms is squeezing margins in mortgage lending, the development of electronic
systems for marketing mortgage loans through real-estate brokers is giving
nonlocal lenders a growing role in mortgage origination and mortgage servicing. To
meet this competition, thrift institutions may have to add real-estate brokerage to
their product line.In any case, as these innovations mature, many localized
lenders willfindreturns on all three of the activities undertaken by traditional
lenders reduced to an interregionally competitive level. On average, traditional
mortgage financing is becoming a less profitable business. This reduced profit-
ability should encourage former mortgage—lending specialists to diversify their
product mix into a richer variety of financial services.
Effects on Interest-Rate Spreads
CMOs and conventional participation certificates differ importantly in tax-
ability. GNMA and Treasury securities differ in callability. When CMOs were first
issued, spreads between yields on CMOs and yields on equivalent participation
certificates averaged almost 100 basis points. By yearend 1983, the spread seemed
to stabilize around 50 basis points. However, in the spring of 1984, the spread
widened again but only to about 60 basis points. During the same interval, spreads
between GNMA securities and long-term Treasuries declined from over 100 basis
points to about 30 basis points. The narrowing of these spreads sharply reduced
new issues of MBS.
These developments may be explained by inserting Arrow-Debreu notions of
market-completion services into a Marshallian framework for market adjustment.
In markets for the input services employed in producing securitized and electronic
mortgages, market completion takes the form of unbundling component lender
activities and borrower obligations (or of bundling them in combinations not20
previouslyavailable):stripping apart origination, servicing, and warehousing
functions in mortgage lending as well as the time-dated cash flowsand optional
features built into a mortgage contract. Thisstripping parallels the process of
breakingbutcheredchickens apart and reassembling them as packages of homoge-
neous parts, mainly wings, breasts, and legs (Colton, 1933). Strippingpermits the
various parts to be priced separately, instead of as a bundle. Itmay also permit a
better price to be collected for "garbage parts" such asgizzards and backs that
household customers and restaurants may not value muchor at all, by letting
butchers wholesale them out to nonhousehold users.With a well—functioning
market for chicken parts, manufacturers of dog and cat foods andsausagemakers
may purchase supplies of these items in bulk. Who can get the best price forthe
garbage parts probably determines whether supermarkets or meat processers end
up doing the stripping and reassembly. In MBS, for lenders with long maturity
habitats, cash flows from mortgage prepayments probably serve as counterparts to
undesirable cuts of chicken.
It is instructive to contrast the theoretical short-run, intermediate-run, and
long-run effects of such innovations. The Marshallian framework for analyzing
economic disequilibrium posits a sequence of temporary equilibria. Thistheory
permits firms that perform the stripping function to earn extranormal profits in
the short run, but requires that the intermediate-run and long-run equilibriumprice
of chickens and MBS be reduced to sum of the new equilibrium prices of theparts.
In turn, this sum must equal the average cost of producing,stripping, and
repackaging. However, these average costs may vary between the intermediate
and long runs.
If the needed stripping and packaging skills are initially in short supply and
difficult to acquire quickly, wages paid to strippers and repackagers must be bidup21
temporarily. This occurs in the intermediate run both toencourage entry into
stripping and repackaging from allied occupations and to impute excess returns to
the temporarily scarce resources involved in the enterprise.During this inter-
mediate run, the costs of stripping and repackagingmay exceed their long-run
values.
In early 1984, increases in the market value of stripping and packaging skills
led Wall Street recruiters to offer dramatic increases in salary to leading finance
professors and housing-finance agency personnel to move them into positions in the
stripping and repackaging departments of investment-banking firms.
In the long run, like the prices of chickens, the price of CMOs should fall
again as returns to human capital in stripping and repackaging adjusted for
differences in job security and job satisfaction equalize with those paid in
academia and in government-sponsored housing-finance firms.
Effects on Mortgage Borrowers
Because for the nation as a whole mortgage markets were relatively efficient
to begin with, dramatic changes observed in patterns for financing mortgage loans
have only minor effects on the typical mortgage borrower. Having one'smortgage
incorporated into the collateral pool supporting a mortgage-backed security may
marginally reduce the cost of a mortgage loan, but it does not dramatically
complicate either the form of mortgage contracts or the nature of contract
negotiations. However, prevailing contract forms and the negotiation process
itself are being changed by electronic systems for shopping one's mortgage needs
across alternative lenders and by the proliferation of contract options.
As extralocal lenders and new forms of mortgage instruments proliferate,
mortgage borrowers increasingly feel the need to employ a disinterested financial
adviser to help them pick their way through the array of contract interest rates22
and mortgage products offered by different sources.Borrowers recognize that
their sketchy prior knowledge of the market value andparticular advantages and
disadvantages of alternative contract features leave them vulnerable to fast-
talking predators. Consumers' growing need •for financial planning servicesopens
new product opportunities for displaced mortgage lenders and (among others)
enterprising university professors.
Distributional Transition Costs Versus Permanent Efficiency Benefits
Although transition costs of adapting to technological change impose a
distributional burden on transitional mortgage lenders, winners and losers are not
foreordained. If savings banks and S&Ls adapt quickly and appropriately to thenew
risk-management, mortgage-origination, and mortgage-pooling systems, they can
earn much the same profits as nontraditional players can.
Over the long run, innovation in mortgage markets is clearly progressive. It
is permanently lightening the pain and drudgery ofmortgage contracting and
broadening and liquifying secondary and forward markets for mortgages. The
result is an increase in the availability and affordability ofmortgage funds, a
steady expansion in the set of financial functions that a mortgage loan can perform
for parties on either side of a mortgage contract, and an increasing demand for
expert financial advice.Traditional players that fail to seize the business
opportunities these developments provide will be left behind. However, for the
permanence of their maladaption, they will have no one to blame but themselves.
Effects on Mortgage Guarantors
What we may call the dark side of recent changes in mortgage technology
concerns increased financial pressure on ill-informed mortgage borrowers and
dangers to the stability of the financial system raised by regulatory lags. In the
housing-finance system, the risk-bearers of last resort have been slow to appreci-
ate the changing nature of the risks that the new generation of destandardized-- 23
mortgages passes through to them and even slower to take action to bring these
risks back under their administrative control.




4. The Fed,theU.S. Treasury,and ultimately thegeneraltaxpayer.(These
partiesexplicitly or implicitly5 back up the first threesets ofinsurance
providers).
Thefirstthreesetsof insurershave onlyrecently begun to see thatthe
deepest layersofthe inflationriskandinterest—volatility risk thatdestroyedthe
market value of bookable net worth in the thrift industry and at FNMAduring
1965-1982 have not truly been shifted to mortgage borrowers through ARMs. In
ARMs, risk shifting remains incomplete for two reasons:
1. Because many ARMs place lifetime and interim on the magnitudes of
increases in contract interest rates. This means that most of the effects
of very sharp swings in interest rates still pass through to lender net
worth.
2. Because the FSLLC's stated preference for ARM lending, the thrift
industry's depleted capital position, and the massive inflow of FDIC- and
FSLIC-subsidized funds into Money Market Deposit Accounts have encour-
aged a relaxation in underwriting standards that has greatly increased the
degree of credit risk in ARM loans.
In a superficially conceived effort to reduce the deposit-insurance subsidy to
interest—volatility risk, deposit insurers have encouraged thrifts to make ARMs
instead of FRMs.Similarly, until the spring of 1934, mortgage insurers
treated ARMs as if these potentially graduated-payment instruments were subject
to roughly the same level of default risk as level-payment FRMs. They failed to24
adjust mortgage-insurance premiumsand house—appraisal and mortgagor-qualifica-
tion practices to take account of the distinctly greater dangers of default that are
occasioned by the built-in graduated payment shock dictated by sharp first-year
interest—rate buydowns and by the possibilities of negative amortization and
downward trends in the future price of housing.
As Villani (1984) has emphasized, empirical evidence suggests that the chance
of mortgage default rises with the level and volatility of two ratios that are
central to any mortgage financing:
I. the ratio of the monthly payment to the borrower's income;
2. the mortgage's loan-to-value ratio.
For this reason, honest measures of these central ratios are critical to determining
whether a borrower is qualified for any particular mortgage loan.
With level-payment fixed-rate financing, only the denominator of each ratio
is subject to adverse variation: the borrower's income and the value of the home.
The monthly payment is fixed and amortization steadily reduces the amount of the
outstanding Joan. But with adjustable-rate financing, the monthly payment may
increase sharply and amortization may turn negative. Moreover, in the environ-
ment of the mid-1980s, the value of the collateral may go down as easily as it may
go up.During 1965-1980, except for special neighborhood effects, average
property values moved favorably.
Given this increase in credit risk, mortgagors, mortgagees, and mortgage
insurers need to analyze alternative ARM contracts with great care. This requires
access to an appropriate information system and techniques of analysis. None of
these parties should make decisions without consulting a reliable advisor possessing
good communication skills and access to fast and reliable software.
If borrowers are vulnerable to fast-talking mortgage originators who in the
manner of automobile salesmen prey on the unwary, mortgage insurers are, too. In25
Texas, borrowers are reported to have received first-year interest rates bought
down as much as eight percentage points. Buydowns of this magnitudetempt a
borrower to try to cut the effective return on his loan by taking theinitial-period
discount and planning to bargain (to the extent that discountpoints paid at
purchase and prepayment penalties allow) for either a fresh buydown or at least a
better basic contract rate in a subsequent financing. At the same time, under
current appraisal practices, buydowns large enough to tempt borrowers to buy more
house than they can afford pass more risk to insurers than theymay prefer to take
on. Large buydowns tend to be financed by builders and hornesellers who want to
bid up the transactions price of the house. This lets them transform what would be
flows of ordinary income into capital gains on an installment sale. This practice
tends to misrepresent the composition of the buyer's equity (by recording thepart
of a borrower's equity that results from his below-market loan position as art
increase in the value of the collateral) and by contributing to an overestimation of
the appraised prices of other houses that appraisers may regard as comparable to
it.
It is both microeconomically and macroeconomically dangerous to approve
contracts whose potential payment shocks are too large for a sizeable proportion of
borrowers to handle. In 1983-84, aggregate default risk in ARM loans has risen
quickly. Guarantors (private mortgage insurers, FNMA, GNMA, FHLMC, the U.S.
Treasury,and ultimately the general taxpayer) are exposed to interest—volatility
risk and inflation risk, but now the danger flows not only through the effects of
interest and inflation on the capitalized value of mortgagees' holdings of outstand-
ing mortgage loans, but also on their effects on the average rate of mortgagor
default. Today, the risk that increases in interest rates and inflation may occasion
widespread mortgage defaults is very real.
Because financial analysis ultimately focuses on tradeoffs between risk and
return, in evaluating any investment opportunity, two questions predominate;26
I.What are the relevant risks?
2. What return is offeredfor takingthese risks on?
Switching fromFRMs toARMs changes the Treasury's and the taxpayer's
ultimateexposure to unpriced interest-volatility and inflation risk from mortgage
loans a good deal less than a naive observer mightsuppose. It mainly changes the
precise channels through which this risk converges on the Treasury. The capped
portion of the risk still falls on deposit insurers.6 The uncapped portion of the
interest-volatility risk that used to pass directly through thrifts and deposit-
insurance agencies now flows first through borrowers and private and government-
sponsored mortgage insurers.
ARM riskiness is excessive today because a breakdown in the system of
mortgage-market incentives provides unintended government subsidies to mortgage
risk. Mispricing Treasury guarantees causes adverse selection by mortgage lenders
and mortgage borrowers alike. Mortgage originators, privatemortgage insurers,
and the government-sponsored mortgage corporations all face incentives that lead
them to maximize the volume of business they do and to be careless about
certifying and pricing the degree of interest and credit risk in contemporary
mortgage loans. S&L risk-bearing is subsidized by the FSLIC. In setting up to
insure GPMs and ARMs, private mortgage insurers carried over experience ratings
and qualification practices that were appropriate for level-payment FRMs. The
industry's lag in recognizing the need to develop different practices was lengthened
by fringe competitors that gambled in a go-for-broke manner on establishing a
much-larger foothold in the market.
Risk-taking by PMI managers is encouraged to some degree by their faith
that political pressure would lead the Treasury and Federal Reserve to step in to
truncate their losses in the event of an industry-wide debacle. In May 1984, this-
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faith was reinforcedby federal regulators' handling of the crisis at Continental
IllinoisBank.If this faith is well-placed, whenever industry leadersadopt a
questionable practice, the deepest layers of the resulting PMI riskexposure are
-shifted implicitly and costlessly to the federalgovernment.
Finally, the government-sponsored mortgage corporations faceconflicting
incentives. Theirs is a duaJ mission: to promote homefinancing and mortgage-
market stability and to earn profits in theprocess. Because the deepest layers of
the portfolio risk that they take is also underwrittenby implicit Treasury
guarantees that remain unpriced, pursuing large amounts of interest-rate and
credit risk improves their prospective rate of return, too.Hence, whenever the net
worth of one of these corporations is underwater, its natural reaction isto adopt a
riskier investment strategy. It is no accident that, as FNMA's net worthsunk to
negative levels, the volume of its mortgage purchases soared.
Policy Remedies:In mortgage markets, the controllability of various
subsidies that are built into the regulatory system is reducedby lags in the
responses of Jenders, MBS packagers, and insurers in the home-finance industry to
technological change. Deposit insurers' poorly thought-out efforts to lead thrifts
to switch from FRMs to ARMs illustrate the problem and remindme of a story
about two lumberjacks. One of them, a man named RandomRates, was always
bullying the other. The second lumberjack's name was Fitz (Fitz Lick, actually).
Those of you familiar with the Monty Pythonsong, "I'm a Lumberjack and
I'm Okay," know that lumberjacks amuse themselves in oddways. Because Fita was
a little slow in the brains department, Random had aneasy time playing tricks on
him. RandomTs favorite trick was to hold his open hand just in front ofa mammoth
redwood tree and to dare Fin to punch the palm of his hand as hardas he could.28
Just as Fitz would release his punch, Random would pull his hand back and Fitz
would end up painfully smashing his hand into the tree. (Spectators likened the
process to watching Charlie Brown trying to placekick a football out of a hold by
Lucy.) After months of watching Fitz injure himself in this way, one of the other
lumberjacks finally tired of the game and explained to Fitz just how Random was
able to slip his punches. Determined to turn the tables on Random, Fin practiced
setting up and pulling his hand away for hours until he had the move down pat.
Then, he found Random and proudly dared him to try to land a punch on his hand.
As Random wound up to swing at him, a gleeful Fitz eagerly lined up his hand
squarely in front of his own face.
The point of the story is that turnabout isn't everything. Shifting interest—
volatility risk to borrowers is a lot more easily said than done. To carry out their
stabilization mission, housing-finance and deposit-insurance agencies should look
for ways to encourage mainstream lenders, appraisers, and insurers to avoid
defective qualification and appraisal practices and excessively hazardous mortgage
instruments. Specifically, they could take the following steps. First, they might
use regulatory pressure and market influence to promote improved qualification
and appraisal practices that would discourage excessive buydowns of initial ARM
interest rates. Clearly, the artificial inflation of transactions prices in housing
caused by interest buydowns does not strengthen the collateral used in qualifying a
borrower for a loan. Similarly, in secondary markets careful originators might be
encouraged to differentiate their product from that of go-for-broke competitors
and to coinsure the loans they sell off under reserve-based arrangements for
posting a credible performance bond. Second, governmental and private guarantors
and rating agencies might set up systems for identifying lenders and insurers whose
operations approach a go-for-broke mode and for imposing an appropriate discount29
or other penalty on the mortgages they bring intosecondary markets.This
approach could implicitly price the Treasury's uhavoidablepiece of the overall
guarantee action and teach lenders and secondary-market investors toquestion the
effectiveness of guarantees provided by particularyaggressive mortgage-insurance
companies. Third, the Administration might draft legislation toprice implicit and
explicit Treasury guarantees of the performance ofmortgage insurers.
Politically Filtered Changes Revisitech The Privatization Issue7
The Reagan Administration has long voiced thesuspicion, that Fannie Mae,
GinnieMae, andFreddie Mac unfairly divert secondary-market opportunitiesaway
fromprivatefirms.Someof the most-prominentargumentscited in support of this
position areeconomicallyfallacious. They assume that the borrowing undertaken
by these federal housing-credit agency-corporations "crowds out" othertypes of
debt.This assumption is fallacious because, as creditintermediaries, these
agencies do very little net borrowing. Their portfolio activity servesmainly to
arbitrage the cost of credit in different sectors of the capital market.Virtually
every dollar they borrow is recommitted in the housing—finance sector of the credit
market. However, a logical basis for the Administration'sconcern lies in
exemptions these federal agency-corporations are granted from securitiesregula-
tions and in their liabilities' receiving valuableexplicit and implicit guarantees
from the U.S.Treasurywithout these corporations having topay an appropriate fee
for the value received.8
If Administration reformers wish to remove theoffending subsidies, this
could be accomplished in either of two ways. The moststraightforward approach
would be to eliminate inappropriate burdens that securitiesregulation of MBS
places on private players and to eliminate the Treasury guarantees by recapitaliz-30
ingeach corporation as a strictly privateentity. Alternatively,Treasuryofficials
could at least endeavor to determine and to collect fromeach agency-corporation
the market value of the Treasury guarantees itenjoys.
The TIMs Question.These conceptually simple approaches must raise
unspecified political, bureaucratic, and pricing problems, becauseCongress has
consistently followed the economically less-defensible course ofcontrolling the
aggregate size of Treasury guarantees by placing various restrictions on these
agency_corporations! asset and liability powers. Continuing this tradition,legisla-
tion drafted to broaden opportunities forgreater private participation in secondary
markets by authorizing the formation of CMO-like "Trusts forInvestment in
Mortgages" (or TIMs) specifically excludes Mr. Mac and the Mae Sisters from
organizing such trusts. This exclusion was intended to impose statutory controlson
the mortgage_securitization activities of theagency-corporations. Elements of
various bills now before Congress would: authorize theuse of a nontaxable trustee;
exempt TIMs from SEC registration and net capital requirements imposed on
broker—dealers; grant broker-dealers the power to extend credit topurchasers of
mortgage-backed securities; allow appropriate investment authority to thrifts and
national banks; and preempt state blue-sky laws whichmight otherwise make it
illegal for state-chartered institutions to market private MBS issues.
As a trust, a TIM could not only repartition cash flows froma mortgage pool
as a CMO trustee does now, it could also purchasemortgages directly into the
trust. Putting mortgages into such trusts takes them completely off the books of
originators and, if adopted prior to the 1984 tax act, would have openedup several
favorable timing options for taxable investors. Although thesetax—timing options
are being phased out under the Tax Reform Act of 1984, they would havepermitted
an investor to use mortgage prepayments and fluctuations in interest rates to lower31
theeffectivetax rate on the income themortgage generates by realizing declines
in market valueas short—term capital losses and taking increases in market value
aslong-term capital gains (Villani, 1933; Constantinides and Ingersoll, 1983). For
whole single-family mortgages and many mortgage participationcertificates, even
prior to the 1984 tax act, discounts had to be amortized unfavorably as ordinary
income and premiums to be amortized unfavorably as capital losses.However,
timing options could be claimed both for mortgages on multifamily properties
(providing they may be construed to be corporate debt) and for "actively traded"
mortgage-backed securities.The latter provision appears to be a loophole
inadvertently opened by Title V of The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 in the
process of defining rules to govern the tax treatment of straddles. It seems likely
that, in an audit situation, the IRS would contest taxpayer attempts to apply this
language to ordinary trades.
Most (if not all) of the timing options that would have been opened by TIMs
have been rendered moot by the 1934taxact and in any case already accrue to
holders of CMO "bonds." However, TIMs would allow mortgage originators and
packagers two other advantages: accounting flexibility as to whether to record an
issue of MBS instruments as a liability or an asset sale and taxsavings for thrift
investors. Unlike CMOs (which are classified as bonds the Financial Accounting
Standards Board and by the IRS), thrift-institution investments in a TIM should
qualify as mortgage assets under Section 593 of the tax code, which governs
favorable tax treatment of transfers to bad-debt reserves. It is more than a little
ironic that what is advertised as a technique for getting the government out of the
mortgage-subsidization business would increase the flow of tax expenditures to
mortgage-lending and mortgage-banking institutions.
Even if these tax expenditures could be determined to be socially desirable,
authorizing TIMs is not a necessary condition for their occurrence. It would be32
simplerfor Congress merely to define some or all series of CMOs as qualified
assets under Section 593. Moreover, Sears Mortgage Corporation maintains that a
tax—exempt vehicleforholding assets in trust already exists under current tax law.
According to Sears and its affiliated underwriter Dean Witter, interest received by
a self-liquidating mortgage trust should not be taxed at the conduit level. Acting
on this opinion, Dean Witter formally bought $1 billion in GNMA securities for
incorporation into self-liquidating trusts. In February 1984, it sold investors $500
million of CMO-like multiclass shares in such a trust. When the IRS formally
objected to the structure of this deal and proposed to tax such trusts as
associations or partnerships, members of the Sears braintrust claimed to be
confident that the courts would uphold their interpretation of the tax status of
trust income. However, by August 1984, Dean Witter had not shown itself
confident enough to issue another round of these securities, as it could have done
by promising to compensate investors in the event the courts should rule against
their contention. According to the August 13, 1984 issue of Bond Week, Dean
Witter chose to sell off its second $500 million of GNMA securities directly into
the market instead.
Privatization versus Economic Efficiency. Economically, the Administra-
tion's goal of "privatizing" housing credit need not in itself increase economic
efficiency. What could increase economic efficiency would be to place greater
reliance on free markets and to identify and to eliminate waste in the operation of
federal subsidy programs. Neither of these more-appropriate goals is obviously
promoted in the draft legislation on TIMs that the Reagan Administration circulat-
ed in February, 1984. The draft bill seeks simultaneously to authorize TIMs and to
spare operators of TIMs from having to compete against agency-guaranteed CMOs.
The draft plan is to prohibit the future use of CMOs that are supported by
mortgage-backed securities issued by federal agencies and to deny FNMA, GNMA,
and FHLMC the right to package CMOs of their own.
This proposal goes beyond the fair competitive chance at CMO-type business
that financial-industry representatives requested in Congressional hearings last33
year (U.S. Senate,1984). It would actually punish FHLMCfor having participated
in introducing so successful an innovation as the CMO and hand its share of future
businessover to tax-exempt copy-cat privatecompetitors.
Barring importantcompetitors isseldom a promising way of establishing
economic efficiency. On the contrary, the modern theory of industrialorganiza-
tion emphasizes the desirability of minimizing barriers to entry intoany product
line in which existing competitors earn above-normal returns.
To make economic sense of the Administration's proposal, we must attribute
two assumptions to its architects. First, they must estimate that the value of the
Treasury's implicit and explicit guarantees of CMOs is large and hard to price.
Second, they must estimate that the disruptive transition costs of terminating a
prosperous enterprise in agency CMOs is small.
Data need to be developed on both of these issues. My preliminary judgment
is that both assumptions are dangerously false. First, given that a private markets
exist both for mortgage insurance and for FNMA stock, pricing out the value of
Treasury guarantees of mortgage—backed securities should be a relatively straight-
forward (albeit tedious) problem. Prohibiting agencies from being active in CMO
markets would be far less efficient than charging them the value of the guarantees
their activity generates. Moreover, if Treasury guarantees were fully priced, they
could be sold directly to private as well as public issuers of MM. Having to
compete against private packagers on an equal basis would let the market
determine whether the FNMA, GNMA, and FHLMC could operate efficiently
enough to survive.
Second, except for distortions caused by the subsidy to risk-bearing, I believe
that the competitive force exercised by the big-three agency-corporations in MBS
has been progressive. As potential entrants into any mortgage-related enterprise,34
these arbitrageurs keep mortgage and capital marketsclosely linked and help to
keep local markets for mortgages from departing very far and very long from
nationwide competitive norms. While wholly new private entities coulddevelop to
perform these same functions, it may be wasteful to incur the transition costs of
demolishing a structure that could be brought under market incentives at much
lower cost.
A Summary Perspective
Change is a permanent part of any healthy financial landscape. In fact, the
only thing permanent in finance may be the very fact of change. Always on the
lookout for instructive metaphors, financial columnists have compared the acceler-
ation of financial change that has occurred in the 1980s to a revolution.However,
because the word "revolution" places the process in a political rather than
evolutionary context, I prefer to compare financial change to a biological
morphosis. Both metaphors dramatize the sharpness of the changes taking place,
but they disagree as to the suddenness of the switch and the logical necessity,
intelligibility, and manageability of the process involved.Metamorphosis is
exemplified by the slow conversion of a caterpillar into a butterfly or the rapid
passage of Lon Chaney, Jr. into the Wolfman. A metamorphosis is a predictable
and endogenous transformation: a welcome or unwelcome change of form. In
contrast, the overthrow of a constitutional government is surprising and organized
by disgruntled outside parties plotting in secrecy.In financial change, the
disgruntled parties are usually customers and consumerists rather than the inno-
vators, whose interest in building a profitable career leads them to develop new
patterns by which to serve these customers.
While incentive problems are raised by regulatory lags in responding to
technological developments, financial change is shaped by economic logic rather35
than by politicalgrievances and spreadsitsshoots gradually through time and
space.Reliance on the wrong metaphor has led to the widely voicedimpression
that political acts of "deregulation" are breaking down establishedpatterns of
competition in the U.S. On the contrary, political adjustments in the regulatory
framework are following rather than leading financial change. Moreover, while the
precise timing of the various institutional transformations is hard to forecast, the
generalized spread of new financial instruments and new patterns of financial
competition may be anticipated by any knowledgeable observer and is in fact a
source of relatively predictable gains and losses.
Another potentially useful metaphor is that of a geological upheaval:
Financial change may be compared to a shift in the terrain of competition. Like a
metamorphosis, such shifts are sometimes sudden and sometimes gradual in their
development. Although some pre—existing competitors are disadvantaged by the
shifting lay of the land, others are strengthened. What matters is not only what
happens to the ground one occupies, but also how rapidly a competitor adapts his
operations to his altered circumstances and whether the government declares his
property part of a disaster area.
Managers who are quick on their feet reap new opportunities, while managers
who spend their energy mourning for the good old days typically see their markets
transformed away from them. The benefits of the changes discussed in this paper
lie principally in opening up markets to new customers and new suppliers. The
costs lie in reducing the controllability of pre-existing subsidies to risk-bearing. By
facilitating market entry, stripped and electronic mortgage instruments decrease:
financial transactions costs, average profit margins, effective tax rates, and the
net implicit tax rate that government regulation levies on activities in U.S.
financial markets.36
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FOOTNOTES
10fcourse, both the old and the new policy procedures expose the net worth of
these institutions to secular deterioration.
2Similar effects onspot markets for financial instruments from introducing
parallel futures markets are discussed in Jaffee (1984).
3Guttentag (1984) provides an insightful discussion of therange of features
available in destandardized mortgages. Lea and Brown (1984) use data from a
Freddie Mac survey of lenders conducted in August and September of 1983 to
estimate the yield differentials associated with differential contract features.
4Colton (1983) estimates that in June 1983only 33 percent of the $158.6 billion of
mortgages traded in the secondary market were purchased by private participants.
5lmplicit guarantees arise out of predictable politicalpressures for federal
authorities to bail out (i.e., truncate the losses of) institutions that fail spectacu-
larly.
6Consistent with the view that thedeepest layers of interest-rate risk pass on to
governmental third parties, FHLMC survey data analyzed by Lea and Brown (1984)
indicate that, controlling for other features, caps have an insignificant (and often
negative) effect on contract interest rates.
7seiders (1984) also covers this issue.
8Moreover, because their arbitrage activity increases the flow of resources toward
a tax-advantaged set of investments, even if the federal housing-credit corpora-
tions were not subsidized, we could not be sure that their behavior increases
economic efficiency.